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Chapter 3  
 








Succession law affects all families at an emotionally vulnerable time. As the family unit 
struggles to adapt to the loss of a key figure, estate distributions are a frequent source of 
conflict within common law systems, where the core value of testamentary freedom allows an 
individual to bequeath property on death as they see fit.1 One of the most bitter examples 
occurs between adult children, following the death of their sole surviving parent.2 While 
children are regarded as the ‘natural’ recipients of parental assets and the majority of wills 
reflect this,3 modern distributive patterns favour equal treatment- a socially constructed norm 
that emerged in the late twentieth century in Britain and other Western countries.4 As a result, 
disputes invariably occur when one child receives a larger share of the net financial estate 
than another or (in a more extreme scenario) inherits everything to the exclusion of his/her 
siblings; the allocation of specific items of property creates a similar effect where one child is 
                                                 
∗ Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast. I am grateful to Professor Clare Huntington and 
Professor Prue Vines for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.   
1 In sharp contrast to fixed inheritance rights in civil law jurisdictions- see for example, AL Marques, ‘We Are 
Not Born Alone and We Do Not Die Alone: Protecting Intergenerational Solidarity and Refraining Cain-ism 
Through Forced Heirship’ (2014) 4 Oñati Socio-Legal Series.  
2 In a typical two-parent family model, inheritance issues seldom arise on the death of the first parent since 
shared parental assets typically pass to the survivor; it is the death of the surviving parent that triggers the 
distribution of assets between children and the sort of estate contests that this chapter considers.  
3 See for example, G Douglas, H Woodward, A Humphrey, L Mills and G Morrell, ‘Enduring Love? Attitudes 
to Family and Inheritance Law in England and Wales’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 245.  
4 M Isaacs, ‘Distributing Your Inheritance Fairly: Equity Theory and Will Power’ (1998) Eastern Psychological 
Association, available at http://scholarworks.rit.edu/article/191 (accessed January 2016). See also D Drake, ‘The 
Will: Inheritance Distribution and Feuding Families’ in M Mitchell (ed), Remember Me: Constructing 
Immortality- Beliefs on Immortality, Life and Death (Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 2007) 97 citing research 
findings by RJ Simon, ML Fellows and W Rau, ‘Public Opinion About Property Distribution at Death’ (1982) 5 
Marriage and Family Review 25 and J Finch, L Hayes, J Masson, J Mason and L Wallis, Wills, Inheritance and 
Families (Oxford, Clarendon, 1996). The social norm that children should be treated equally is clearly time-
based. For example, inheritance laws in most common law (and civil law) jurisdictions favoured sons over 
daughters, and also prioritised the eldest son until relatively recently (though gender preference can still be 
apparent when parents are allocating receive specific items of property- see Pt III). However, there is also a 
strong socio-cultural dimension, since not every modern society or culture sees equality as the norm; for 
example, gender inequalities still exist in parts of Africa and Latin America where males have preferential 
inheritance rights (see for example, CD Deere and M León, ‘The Gender Asset Gap: Land in Latin America’ 
(2003) 31 World Development 925), and also within certain systems of customary law (see for example, MF 
Radford, ‘Inheritance Rights of Women Under Jewish and Islamic Law’ (1999) 23 Boston College International 
& Comparative Law Review 135). 
given the family home or other symbolic realty,5 or parental possessions imbued with 
monetary or sentimental worth. The financial consequences of an uneven distribution can be 
severe, with comparatively high levels of personal wealth among the ‘baby boomers’6 
creating larger estates to pass on.7 However, the emotional consequences are just as serious; 
inheritance inequities (whether real or perceived) are a perfect breeding ground for acrimony 
and rancour which rupture family ties. 
 
Of course emotions run through many legal disputes, and private law actions are no 
exception- even in the average tort, contract or property claim where the parties are 
transacting on an ‘arm’s length’ basis. However, when private law litigants are related to each 
other, the emotional dynamics take on added significance. Family law disputes are typified 
by emotion, and, despite a comparatively slow start,8 the area has assumed a more prominent 
role in law and emotions scholarship.9 Within the current collection, Professor Huntingdon’s 
chapter on domestic relations and the ‘affective family’10 makes another important 
contribution to this burgeoning literature. In contrast, succession law has been largely 
overlooked by law and emotions scholars, despite the centrality of the family in testamentary 
giving and the crucial role that emotions play in inheritance disputes- especially those 
involving adult children following the testate death of a parent.11  
 
Sibling relationships can be fraught; these tensions can carry on for years and often 
come to a head when a parent dies. A will, and especially one that gives children unequal 
shares of the estate, can trigger a lifetime of negative feelings and drive the disappointed 
                                                 
5 For example, a family farm or business; an old family vacation property.  
6 See generally J Hills, F Bastagli, F Cowell, H Glennerster, E Karagiannaki and A McKnight, Wealth in the 
UK: Distribution, Accumulation and Policy (Oxford, OUP, 2013). 
7 This is still an important fiscal event, despite well-documented changes in the intergenerational transfer of 
wealth. A significant part occurs while parents are still alive and providing ongoing financial support to adult 
children (for example, paying university fees, financing a business venture and assisting with house purchases), 
while increased longevity also means that baby boomers are consuming more of their own capital post-
retirement; both mean fewer assets to pass on- see JH Langbein, ‘The Twentieth Century Revolution in Family 
Wealth’ (1988) 86 Michigan Law Review 722 and C Sappideen, ‘Families and Intergenerational Transfers: 
Changing the Old Order?’ (2008) 31 University of New South Wales Law Journal 738. 
8 See K Abrams, ‘Barriers and Boundaries: Exploring Emotion in the Law of the Family’ (2009) 16 Virginia 
Journal of Social Policy & the Law 301, 307.  
9 See the various sources cited in Abrams (n 8), as well as S Moldonado, ‘Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing 
Hostility and Conflict After Divorce’ (2008)  43 Wake Forest Law Review  441, C Huntingdon, ‘Repairing 
Family Law’ (2008) 57 Duke Law Journal 1245 and C Huntingdon, ‘Family Law’ (2010) 59 Emory Law 
Journal 10. 
10 See Huntington, Ch 2.  
11 While intestacy distributions are also based on established kinship networks, the emphasis here is on will-
making because the will-maker’s freedom of choice and how this is perceived by his/her survivors makes it 
more amenable to a law and emotions analysis than a legislatively mandated universal scheme.  
sibling to litigation.12 As we shall see, a number of features make these particular contests so 
inherently emotional: the fact that they centre on the two most formative and enduring family 
relationships (parent-child, and sibling-sibling), both coloured by years of history and 
personal interactions; the symbolic qualities of inherited wealth, along with attachments to 
specific items of property; parental intent, and the significance of the will as a conscious 
expression of someone’s last wishes; and the personal, familial and social connotations of an 
uneven inheritance.   
 
This chapter unpacks the underlying emotional narrative, identifying the complex 
sentiments that create and fuel inheritance disputes between adult siblings. Drawing primarily 
on a mix of legal, psychological and sociological literature which attributes many of these to 
unresolved childhood issues, it argues that estate conflicts have a distinctive contextual 
backdrop which exacerbates these negative feelings and ups the emotional ante even further. 
In keeping with the overall themes of the collection, the chapter goes on to look at how these 
emotions are reflected in legal processes and by legal actors. For example, while Anglo-
American jurisprudence suggests a more nuanced emotional response to estate contests than 
in other areas of legal decision-making, the fact that judges often intervene when presented 
with an uneven estate distribution can indirectly reveal what they feel about sibling (or more 
usually) parental behaviour here. The chapter concludes by considering how the emotional 
fall-out could be lessened, by will-makers, lawyers and the legal system being more 
cognisant of the underlying psychological and emotional dynamics.  
 
 
II. DEATH AND DISCORD: THE PERFECT EMOTIONAL STORM 
 
Emotions are intrinsic to family relationships. While siblings experience a range of emotions- 
both positive and negative- throughout their collective lives, the death of a parent takes them 
into unchartered territory. Kennedy describes parental death as a ‘shattering experience’, 
which floods individuals with ‘powerful forces’ as the ‘boundaries of [their] world are torn 
away’.13 In many ways, this experience is not unique to siblings; the loss of any loved one is 
a traumatic experience as intimate bonds and personal relationships are irrevocably altered by 
                                                 
12 The following contextual caveat is important, and will be revisited later in the chapter: leaving an estate 
unevenly does not actually mean that the parent favours one child over another; the underlying reasons vary (see 
pp 12-13), even if the excluded or marginalised child is likely to interpret the parent’s actions in a negative way. 
13 A Kennedy, Losing a Parent: Passage to a New Way of Living (New York, HarperOne, 1991) 2. 
death’s seismic forces.14 Yet, in some respects, it is more pronounced. Adult children, 
regardless of their age, feel anchorless and cast adrift as they mourn the loss of a life-long 
relationship; the fact that death is in the natural order of things is irrelevant, as they confront 
an altered reality without the parent’s comforting, constant presence.15 Parental death also 
precipitates unprecedented change,16 forcing siblings to navigate unchartered relational 
territory while finding a new emotional equilibrium- both as individuals and as a group.17 
Strong sibling bonds can be a source of comfort during this time, with Milvesky highlighting 
their compensatory value following the loss of a parent.18 Yet, while we instinctively assume 
that death brings families together, the reality can be very different.  
 
Death produces a range of complex and disorientating emotions, which manifest 
themselves through the grieving process.19 For example, Lindemann famously identified grief 
as a syndrome comprising five key elements: somatic disturbance, preoccupation with the 
image of the deceased, guilt, hostility and disorganised behaviour.20 In similar vein, Bowlby 
and others have analysed it as involving numbness and disbelief, anxiety and anger, 
depression and despair.21 Despite subtle variances in the overall mode of expression, 
psychologists concede that anger and aggression are common features of the grieving 
process. The inevitable and inescapable sense of change for those who are left behind results 
in post-mortem stress, a sense of ‘sheer pressure [which] bereavement places upon the body 
                                                 
14 See for instance, K Charmaz, The Social Reality of Death: Death in Contemporary America (Reading, 
Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1980) and F Walsh and M McGoldrick (eds), Living beyond 
Loss: Death in the Family (New York, WW Norton and Co, 1991). 
15 See generally, D Umberson, Death of a Parent: Transition to a New Adult Identity (Cambridge, CUP, 2006) 
and R Abrams, When Parents Die: Learning to Live with the Loss of a Parent (Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 3rd 
edn, 2012). 
16 Natural realignments and adjustments are inevitable, adding to the sense of posthumous disarray- CI Murray, 
K Toth and S Clinkenbeard, ‘Death, Dying and Grief in Families’ in P McKenry and S Price (eds), Families and 
Change: Coping with Stressful Life Events (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 3rd edn, 2005) 75. 
17 The death of a parent also causes the children to confront their own mortality, since (assuming a natural order 
of events) the children are now next-in-line to die. This can trigger negative emotions, as well as worries about 
the future and financial security which were not present before.   
18 A Milvesky, Sibling Relationship in Childhood and Adolescence: Predictors and Outcomes (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2011). 
19 E Lindemann, ‘Symtomatology and Management of Acute Grief’ (1944) 101 American Journal of Psychiatry 
797; J Bowlby, ‘The Process of Mourning’ (1961) 42 International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 331; J Bowlby 
and C Parkes, ‘Separation and Loss within the Family’ in CJ Antony and C Koupernick (eds), The Child and his 
Family (London, Wiley, 1970) 197; and CM Parkes, Bereavement: Studies of Grief in Adult Life (London, 
Tavistock Press, 1972). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Bowlby and Parkes (n 19). See also J Archer, The Nature of Grief: the Evolution and Psychology of Reactions 
to Loss (London, Routledge, 1999) 24-26 and A Levy, The Orphaned Adult (Reading, Massachusetts, Perseus 
Books, 1999) 23. 
and mind as an integrated whole’.22 Past grievances often resurface following the death of a 
loved one. Emotions are running high; and where families are prone to conflict, bereavement 
acts as a ‘stress amplifier’,23 putting additional strain on already fragile relationships.24 
However, sibling dynamics take this to another level, as unresolved childhood issues come to 
the fore.  
 
Sibling bonds can last for a lifetime, making this one of the most enduring 
relationships that individuals can develop and foster.25 Of course, few families conform to a 
utopian behavioural ideal, and siblings are no different. While part of a family unit, they are 
also unique individuals with distinct character traits, making them just as prone to personality 
clashes as other interpersonal relationships. At a more basic level, Brody notes that sibling 
relationships are ‘rarely characterized by very high levels of support along with low levels of 
rivalry and aggression’;26 conflict is much more common. Sibling rivalry is one of the oldest 
emotional experiences within families, and its destructive and divisive nature has been well-
documented throughout human history.27 Underpinned by jealous struggles for parental 
attention from an early age, sibling rivalry exudes a range of feelings such as anger, anxiety, 
distress, resentment and worthlessness- though jealousy often predominates.28 Jealousy itself 
is a self-critical and complex social emotion, invariably triggered by a third party threat 
(whether real or apparent) to a key relationship.29 In the sibling context, it represents ‘the 
most powerful jealousy of youth’ as the presence of a sibling rival threatens the parent-child 
dynamic that is the ‘most important and formative relationship of a young child’s early 
                                                 
22 DJ Davies, Death, Ritual and Belief (London, Continuum, 2nd edn, 2002) 59. 
23 Levy (n 21) 90. See also B Raphael and M Dobson, ‘Bereavement’ in JH Harvey and ED Miller (eds), Loss 
and Trauma: General and Close Relationship Perspectives (Philadelphia, Brunner-Routledge, 2000) 50-53. 
24 ES Traylor, B Hayslip, PL Kaminski and C York, ‘Relationships between Grief and Family System 
Characteristics’ (2003) 27 Death Studies 575. American drama film August: Osage County (Smokehouse 
Pictures, 2013), which reunites three siblings, their acerbic mother and the wider family circle at the father’s 
funeral, illustrates this perfectly. 
25 Milvesky (n18) ix citing VG Cicirelli, ‘Sibling Influence Throughout the Lifespan’ in ME Lamb and B 
Sutton-Smith (eds), Sibling Relationships: Their Nature and Significance Across the Lifespan (New York, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1982) 267-284.  
26 GH Brody, ‘Sibling Relationship Quality: Its Causes and Consequences’ (1998) 49 Annual Review of 
Psychology 1, 19. 
27 For example, it is a recurring theme throughout the Bible- Cain’s slaying of his brother Abel in the Book of 
Genesis (Genesis 4: 1-16) and the parable of the prodigal son in the Gospel of Luke (Luke 15:11-32). More 
recent examples on this side of the Atlantic include the infamous spat between Noel and Liam Gallagher which 
prompted the 2009 split of Britpop band Oasis, and the 2010 Labour Party leadership contest between David 
and Ed Miliband when the younger sibling stood against and ultimately defeated his older brother.  
28 For a psychological analysis, see D Rowe, My Dearest Enemy, My Dangerous Friend: Making and Breaking 
Sibling Bonds (Hove, Routledge, 2007) and J Safer, Cain’s Legacy: Liberating Siblings from a Lifetime of Rage, 
Shame, Secrecy and Regret (New York, Basic Books, 2012). 
29 See generally P Salovey (ed), The Psychology of Jealousy and Envy (New York, The Guilford Press, 1992). 
life’.30 Parents ‘cannot attend and respond to…[all of their] children’s needs at all times’31, 
and siblings invariably compete with each other for parental attention from an early age.32 As 
a result, undercurrents of sibling rivalry probably infuse everyday transactions between 
brothers and sisters, especially when growing up together in the same household. Yet 
sometimes sibling strife develops into something more, straining relationships or causing 
them to break down completely, and generating patterns of behaviour which siblings replicate 
at key stages throughout their adult lives.33 
 
The death of a parent is an obvious trigger, and as siblings come together- perhaps 
returning to their old family home, itself a ‘deeply symbolic repository of memories and 
grievances’34- latent traits re-emerge. In the initial post-mortem period, preoccupation with 
funeral arrangements and fulfilling basic social and legal requirements (obtaining a death 
certificate, liaising with the funeral director, receiving visitors) can prevent simmering 
tensions from spilling over.35 However, discovering the contents of a dead parent’s will often 
puts ‘the final nail in the coffin of…a moribund sibling connection’36 as unequal (or 
ostensibly unjust) distributions reignite ‘old issues of sibling rivalry and dominance’.37 The 
value of specific bequests and objects is not always important; it is the fact that the chosen 
estate distribution determines ‘each beneficiary’s relative importance and position in the 
family’38 and, with adult children, is perceived as a measure of parental love and approval- 
                                                 
30 BL Volling, NL McElwain and AL Miller, ‘Emotion Regulation in Context: The Jealously Complex Between 
Young Siblings and Its Relations with Child and Family Characteristics’ (2002) 73 Child Development 581, 
583. 
31 Volling (n 30) 584. See also LA Keister, ‘Sharing the Wealth: The Effect of Siblings on Adults’ Wealth 
Ownership’ (2003) 40 Demography 521, 522 (‘[p]arents have finite material and non-material resources, and 
additional siblings dilute the amount that can be devoted to each child’). 
32 Studies suggest that infants can exhibit jealousy from as early as six months, if maternal attention is 
channelled elsewhere- see S Hart and H Carrington, ‘Jealousy in Six-Month-Old Infants’ (2002) 3 Infancy 395. 
33 ‘[P]roblems with siblings are childhood experiences in contemporary guise. Rivalry, competition, and anxiety 
about [their] place in [their] parents’ affections underlie these problems, breeding rancor that haunts siblings all 
their lives and recurs in each phase of adulthood- work, marriage, parenthood, caring for aging parents, and 
eventually, settling that perpetual minefield, the estate’- Safer (n 28) 3. 
34 Safer (n 28) 181.  
35 This is not always the case. For example, disputes over funeral arrangements can be an immediate source of 
contention- see H Conway and J Stannard, ‘The Honours of Hades: Death, Emotion and the Law of Burial 
Disputes’ (2011) 34 University of New South Wales Law Journal 860. 
36 Safer (n 28) 157. 
37 J Folberg, ‘Mediating Family Property and Estate Conflicts’ (2009) 23 Probate & Property 8, 9.  
38 PM Accettura, Blood & Money: Why Families Fight Over Inheritance and What To Do About It (Michigan, 
Collinwood Press, 2011) 2. See also JG McMullen, ‘Keeping Peace in the Family While You Are Resting in 
Peace’ (2006) 8 Marquette Elder’s Advisor 61, 81 (an inheritance ‘may represent the approval or love of the 
benefactor-relative’). 
regardless of the will-maker’s underlying intent.39 As Safer points out, notions of parental 
favouritism, and who was loved more, are reinforced and perpetuated here: 
 
Money = Love is a very old equation, one that is played out with a vengeance in 
siblings’ fights over the terms of their parents’ will and the distributions of their 
possessions. The compulsion to demonstrate, in court if necessary, that you really 
were your parents’ favourite (or to compensate for the fact that you were not) 
underlies these battles as much as greed does, and blinds people to the 
consequences, which will almost always include the permanent loss of their 
siblings’ goodwill.40 
 
As far as the children are concerned, any disparities in the estate distribution marks one child 
out as a ‘loser’ in what has been described as the ‘parental-love competition’41, with 
seemingly minor issues about the distribution of parental effects becoming symbolic 
battlefields for resolving claims on parental affection.42 In many ways, estate contests are as 
much about deflected anger towards the dead parent as towards the other siblings,43 as 
parental resentments resurface and are reconstituted by patterns of wealth distribution. An 
unequal inheritance disrupts (and in more extreme examples, destroys) what the disappointed 
beneficiary thought was a secure attachment relationship with their parent, developed and 
nurtured from childhood. The emotional needs of the child can also transcend the death of the 
parent, as the former craves parental validation which will now never materialise because the 
estate has been divided unequally, and the marginalised or excluded child has apparently 
been identified as less ‘worthy’ than their siblings.  
 
What we have here is a toxic mix of negative emotions. Some of these (anger, 
hostility, sadness) are already lurking in the background as natural by-products of the 
grieving process; in the event of an uneven estate distribution, these are amplified and joined 
by other harmful sentiments (jealously, hurt, bitterness, disappointment and rejection, to list a 
few). Sibling inheritance disputes are ‘so emotionally charged that they can easily escalate’.44 
Brothers and sisters refuse to back down in their quest to negate the emotional consequences 
                                                 
39 Again, there are positive reasons why parents divide property unevenly between their children- see pp 12-13. 
40 Safer (n 28) 180-181.  
41 Safer (n 28) 51.  
42 Levy (n 21) 110. 
43 ‘Receiving less preferential treatment is particularly significant to a child because of the potent implications it 
carries…Children’s recognition of the inequality in their relationships with their parents is hypothesized to 
occasion emotional dysregulation, leading to anger that is displaced onto the favored brother or sister’- Brody (n 
26) 12. 
44 T Mayersak, ‘Examining the Use of Arbitration and Dealing with Decedent’s Wishes in Wills, Trusts and 
Estates’ (2010) 12 European Journal of Law Reform 404, 406. 
of an uneven estate distribution, and prove themselves as an equally loved and equally 
worthy parental heir. The underlying feelings are not only complex and all-consuming; they 
can also cause the disappointed sibling to engage in seemingly irrational behaviour, with 
disastrous consequences.45 Destroying or dissipating estate property so that no-one gets 
anything (what Accettura describes as the ‘scorched earth’ approach46) is a classic example- 
and in February 2013, one brother took this to extremes when he destroyed a £300,000 family 
home in Cardiff, Wales with a sledgehammer after falling out with his siblings following a 
seven-year row over inheritance.47 Of course, exorcising the ghosts of sibling rivalry and 
parental favouritism does not usually have such extreme consequences. However, one brother 
or sister’s relentless march towards litigation is not just something which impacts on siblings; 
as members of an ‘interactive, independent network in which behaviour in one individual or 
subsystem affects the others’,48 a ripple effect spreads across the entire family system. Other 
relatives are drawn into the estate contest (even if they do not want to be involved), creating 
an existential emotional crisis which threatens broader family harmony and stability.  
 
 
III. EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENTS TO PROPERTY 
 
Inherited wealth is highly symbolic for siblings, and not just because it connotes parental love 
and approval. Different types of property are imbued with meaning, and generate strong 
emotional attachments, as well as creating their own distinct inheritance expectations.   
 
                                                 
45 The fact that emotions can override rational thought and cause the parties to do things that appear 
‘nonsensical and counterintuitive’ has been documented in the family law context- J Weinstein and R 
Weinstein, ‘“I Know Better Than That”: The Role of Emotions and the Brain in Family Law Disputes’ (2005) 7 
Journal of Law & Family Studies 351, 352 (discussing child custody disputes in particular). See also PH Huang, 
‘Reasons Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law 
Review 435, 439 (‘emotions such as fear and anger disrupt normal rational thought and reasoning capabilities’) 
and G Lowenstein, ‘Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior’ (1996) 65 Organizational Behavior & 
Human Decision Processes 272. 
46 Accettura (n 38) 3. 
47 Tony McGuire had been living in the family home (originally owned by his father) with his wife and six 
children; however, his father’s will left the property to Tony and his two other siblings who were trying to evict 
their brother before he took a sledgehammer to the property and reduced most of it to rubble. Mr McGuire was 
given a two year suspended sentence for what the court described as an ‘appalling act of spite’- ‘Sledgehammer 
House Attack: Tony McGuire Given Suspended Sentence’, BBC News Online, 26 June 2013, located at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-23059344 (accessed January 2016). Ironically, it was 
equal division of the parental estate that caused the problem here.  
48 Brody (n 26) 2. 
Most wills focus on real estate and financial assets, as high value items. The family 
home is a good example;49 since the property is not divisible in a practical sense, and adult 
children who have long since moved away are unlikely to return, a parent’s will might direct 
that the home be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the children. Although 
consistent with social norms around the post-mortem allocation of wealth,50 such directions 
can be problematic for the child who is not keen on selling because of their own emotional 
attachment to the property51- including the sense of both individual and family identity tied 
up in the home.52 In the context of the present chapter, significant issues can arise where the 
parent decides to leave the family home to a particular child (often one who resided there 
with the parent, up until the latter’s death);53 this removes a valuable legacy from the parent’s 
estate, and can generate anger, hurt and resentment on the part of the other siblings, 
regardless of the parent’s intent. Family farms are also valuable items of real property which 
generate strong emotional attachments, yet attract very different inheritance perceptions. Here 
it is not simply a question of whether to divide the land or leave it intact;54 farms tends to be 
passed down through generations,55 traditionally to (eldest) sons.56 Social convention allows 
equality to be sacrificed here, but can still generate bitterness and ill-feeling on the part of the 
non-farming siblings.57 Moving on to financial resources, money and cash convertible assets 
such as stocks and shares can be divided in whatever way a parent sees fit- more so than any 
                                                 
49 Increasing rates of home ownership from the latter half of the twentieth century onwards mean that home 
ownership ‘is no longer for the relatively affluent’ but is ‘now normal experience for “ordinary families” who 
have not accumulated land or vast sums of wealth through the generations- J Finch and J Mason, Passing On: 
Kinship and Inheritance in England (London, Routledge, 2000) 3.  
50 And the law’s mantra to ‘sell and divide’ as the typical default stance where an asset of material value cannot 
be apportioned.  
51 Affective connections to the home have been well-documented- see for example, H Easthope, ‘A Place Called 
Home’ (2004) 21 Housing, Theory and Society 128 and DB Barros, ‘Home as a Legal Concept’ (2006) 46 Santa 
Clara Law Review 255. For a more critical approach, see SM Stern, ‘Residential Protectionism and the Legal 
Mythology of Home’ (2009) 107 Michigan Law Review 1093.  
52 Similar issues can arise where the home is simply bequeathed to children jointly, and one person is not keen 
to sell (because of the emotional attachments just mentioned) yet the other siblings are. Constructs of fairness 
and equality can still create problems here- a situation which also frequently arises with old family cottages and 
vacation properties which parents (acting with the noblest of intentions) often leave to their children as shared 
owners. All too often, the result is discord when one sibling insists on keeping the property to recreate their own 
childhood idylls and another resents having their inheritance tied up in a place which they now only value as a 
cash asset- see SJ Hollander, DS Fry and R Hollander, Saving the Family Cottage: A Guide to Succession 
Planning for Your Cottage, Cabin, Camp or Vacation Home (Chicago, Nolo, 2013). 
53 The same child may have cared for ageing parents, and have no home of their own. 
54 Though a farm may need to stay intact to remain a profitable enterprise- CS Olsen and T Osborn, 
‘Inheritance: “A Tale of Two Perceptions”’ (2006) 1 Online Journal of Rural Research & Policy. 
55 The emphasis here is on ‘intergenerational family farm continuity’- Olsen and Osborn (n 54) 6.  
56 When it comes to inheriting farmland, a ‘gender bias...seems far more frequent and acceptable than is the case 
for the distribution of money’- JJ Goodnow and JA Lawrence, ‘Inheritance Norms for Distributions of Money, 
Land, and Things in Families’ (2010) 1 Family Science 73, 76. 
57 Even with the compensatory gift of a cash settlement, or a plot of land on the farm so they can build their own 
home.   
of the other types of property being looked at here. Yet, siblings will still contest any 
resultant economic disparity, not because of particularly strong emotional attachments to the 
money itself,58 but because of what the unequal distribution symbolises and the feelings that 
this generates.59 
 
Personal possessions, in contrast, are often omitted from the distributive contents of 
the a dead parent’s will;60 and while real estate and money are more likely to trigger the sort 
of litigation discussed later in this chapter, disputes over who gets items of personal property 
(for example, a mother’s wedding ring or a father’s watch; photo albums; lovingly assembled 
collections of books, music or china; family mementoes such as Christmas ornaments and 
holiday souvenirs) can become just as embittered, even if they are less likely to end up in 
court. Any process of allocation is necessarily informal and sibling-led, but suffers from two 
main drawbacks. First, as items accumulated over a parent’s lifetime (and sometimes across 
generations of the same family), they are imbued with personal meaning and have a 
sentimental value unrelated to their economic worth.61 Because they symbolise the dead 
parent, personal possessions engender exceptionally high levels of emotional attachment;62 
on the death of a parent, these attachments are assumed and perpetuated by the child who 
claims it for him/herself as an ongoing narrative of association with the deceased.63 Second, 
the reality is that certain things (for example, a favourite painting, specific pieces of 
jewellery) cannot be divided, fuelling the sense of unfairness.64 Stum highlights ‘[o]ngoing 
rivalries’ and issues of ‘power and control’ among siblings as influencing the transfer of 
                                                 
58 These would differ significantly from the type of affective connections a son or daughter had to, for example, 
their old family home or a dead parent’s personal possessions. 
59 Though Goodnow and Lawrence suggest that bequest of money have ‘personal meanings’ attached and are 
‘often seen as a sign of relationship quality’- Goodnow and Lawrence (n 56) 75.  
60 Finch and Mason (n 49) 145 suggest that many lawyers discourage their clients from distributing items of 
personal property. And even where a will contains a direction to divide personal property evenly among the 
deceased’s children, Stum argues that ‘such vague and impossible directions provide little guidance for 
surviving family members’- MS Stum, ‘Families and Inheritance Decisions: Examining Non-Titled Property 
Transfers’ (2000) 21 Journal of Family and Economic Issues 177, 179.  
61 ‘[M]undane functional goods that were not necessarily singular or cherished can serve as potent material 
footprints of the departed’- D Turley and S O’Donohoe, ‘The Sadness of Lives and the Comfort of Things’ 
(2012) 28 Journal of Marketing Management 1331, 1342.  
62 For a detailed analysis see Stum (n 60) and Finch and Mason (n 49) ch 6. The latter note that the ‘symbolic 
value of personal gifts and possessions is very high’ (ibid, 140) and that ‘keepsakes’ and other reminders have a 
special status because the object ‘carries the memory of the person who owned it but who has now died’ (ibid, 
142).    
63 Such objects ‘symbolize identities which may become the objects of reminiscences by survivors’ (DR Unruh, 
‘Death and Personal History: Strategies of Identity Preservation’ (1983) 30 Social Problems 340, 344) and often 
‘continue to be thought of and named as belonging to former owners even though they are now worn by, used or 
in the possession of other people’ (M Gibson, ‘Death and the Transformation of Objects and Their Value’ 
(2010) 103 Thesis Eleven 54, 55). 
64 Goodnow and Lawrence (n 56) 78.  
personal possessions.65 However, birth order and gender also have a role to play here- for 
example, a brother is more likely to claim a father’s watch than his sisters, while a mother’s 
wedding ring often ends up with the eldest daughter.66   
 
 
IV. THE EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF WILLS 
 
Mayersak has argued that the ‘emotional elements present in wills…disputes are not 
presented, or at least not as prevalent, as in other litigated matters’.67 While death, sibling 
strife and attachments to property are key contributors, the deceased’s will is a highly 
emotive document- adding another layer of complexity.  
 
Finch and others describes the will as a ‘unique form of communication between the 
dead and the living’.68 Imbued with a combination of legal and personal power,69 wills do 
more than establish what the deceased valued in life; the distributional scheme indicates who 
was valued and the important role that certain individuals played in the deceased’s personal 
narrative.70 The final document ‘gives permanent voice to the testator’s wants’,71 articulating 
his/her thoughts and feelings on intensely private matters in what is ultimately a very public 
statement of intent. As financial legacies shade into affective ones, parental wills elicit a 
strong emotional response among grown-up children. Where the distributional scheme is 
more or less what the latter anticipated, the will can be a source of comfort and affirmation. 
Yet, where it creates an unexpected and seemingly unjust division, the will can elicit a hostile 
response, generating feelings of shock, outrage and disbelief.  
 
Both the language used in the will, and the way in which the document is framed, are 
also important. The fact that wills are written in the present tense reinforces the idea that the 
                                                 
65 Stum (n 60) 194.  
66 See the general discussion in Drake (n 4) 98.   
67 Mayersak (n 44) 405. Mayersak exceptionalises wills in the trusts and estates context of her article. Of course, 
other litigated matters are deeply emotional, even if they do not raise exactly the same emotional issues being 
discussed here (the family law arena is an obvious example, if we think about divorce decrees and orders 
terminating parental rights as two basic illustrations). 
68 Finch et al (n 4) 1.  See also P Vines, ‘“In the Name of God, Amen”: Seeking the Testator’s Authentic Voice 
in Research Using Wills’ (2006) 6 Law, Text and Culture 63, 63: ‘Wills are documents which have a unique 
power. No other document can communicate beyond the grave in the voice of the deceased with the same 
combination of legal and personal power’.   
69 Vines (n 68), p 63.   
70 KJ Sneddon, ‘The Will as Personal Narrative’ (2012) 20 Elder Law Journal 355, 396-397.  
71 AA DiRusso, ‘Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic Status’ (2009) 23 Quinnipiac 
Probate Law Journal 36, 61. 
parent is communicating directly with his/her children.72 Yet, the parent’s ‘voice’ may not be 
one that the children recognise, despite this being one of the most personal (and ultimately 
final) exchanges between them. Lawyers drafting wills for their clients adopt standard forms 
of legalise to ensure an operative, transactional document; the result is an emotionally sterile 
and depersonalised narrative, which speaks in an unfamiliar manner.73 Recent commentaries 
have suggested that testators (aided and encouraged by lawyers) should include more 
expressive language in their wills, directly conveying their thoughts and feelings as part of 
the distributive process.74 Glover highlights the therapeutic aspect of this approach, in 
allowing the testator to articulate both positive and negative emotions in the hope that doing 
so will ‘ease family conflict during the administration of the estate’.75 In the parent-child 
context, expressive statements may be useful where the testator wants to explain the 
reasoning behind seemingly inequitable bequests- for example, that benefitting one child 
more than another reflects the former’s straitened financial circumstances, as opposed to 
being a reflection of unequal love. Of course, there is always an element of risk. Explanations 
do not always convey what they are intended to; and just as beauty lies in the eye of the 
beholder, meaningful interpretation (despite the testator’s best efforts) lies in the mind of the 
disappointed child. English novelist Daisy Goodwin, whose mother died in 2013 and left a 
will giving most of her estate to Goodwin’s siblings because they needed it more, still 
struggles with the feeling that this was because her mother loved her less:     
 
[W]hen a parent makes a will, they should be aware that although their children 
may be reasonable adults in every other respect, when it comes to inheritance, 
maturity dissolves into a puddle of childish resentments. Because when a beloved 
parent dies, what is being parcelled out may look like goods and chattels, but it 
feels a lot like love. A parent’s will is not just a legal document; it is the last 
expression of their thoughts and feelings towards their children. It is a testament 
of love.76  
 
 
                                                 
72 Present tense drafting creates an overwhelming sense that the deceased ‘is sharing his or her thoughts at the 
moment of probate’- Sneddon (n 70) 387. 
73 See KJ Sneddon, ‘Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills and Testaments’ (2011) 5 St John’s Law 
Review 683. 
74 Sneddon (n 73) suggests that lawyers and others drafting wills should try to consciously craft a persona that 
injects the individual's voice into the will, while ensuring that the documents continues to be legally effective. 
See also M Glover, ‘A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning’ (2012) 35 Seattle University 
Law Review 427, 455-461 and the sources cited therein. 
75 Glover (n 74) 460. See also TP O’Sullivan, ‘Family Harmony: An All Too Frequent Casualty of the Estate 
Planning Process’ (2007) 8 Marquette Elder’s Advisor 253.   
76 D Goodwin, ‘I Leave My Daughter Daisy Out Of My Estate (The Sunday Times, London) 7 December 2014.  
 
V. BEQUEATHING AN APPROPRIATE EMOTIONAL LEGACY: THE ROLE OF THE 
PARENT 
 
Safer has noted that ‘[w]henever families gather, siblings notoriously take up their 
accustomed positions and reproduce their original dynamics, as though the roles were etched 
on their brains, ready to be magically reconstituted when the cast reassembles’.77 That old 
resentments and rivalries should mysteriously re-surface is hardly surprising. However, a key 
member of the cast is now missing: the dead parent, who mediated sibling disputes in the 
past, but is no longer there to prevent simmering tensions from spilling over.  
 
While it would be easy to say that the deceased’s absence exposes fault lines within 
sibling relationships, inheritance disputes are as much about the parent-child relationship as 
its sibling-sibling correlate. We instinctively assume that parents will divide their wealth 
equally among their offspring; studies tend to bear this out,78 and any differential in treatment 
tends to be viewed as an overtly negative act of parental favouritism. Yet there are positive 
reasons why some parents leave uneven bequests- for example, a child who lived with and 
looked after their parent(s) may be rewarded more than one who was less attentive or 
assumed less of the caregiving burden (thereby reflecting core notions of interfamily 
economic exchange, and reparation for sacrifices rendered); the previous section raised the 
possibility of a parent bequeathing a larger sum to a child with greater financial need than 
his/her siblings.79 As much as this generates resentment and anger amongst the other 
children, it is not clear that unequal division is manifestly unfair here or that it should be 
undone.80 
                                                 
77 Safer (n 28), 59-60. 
78 Empirical studies around inheritance reveal that ‘equal treatment of children is seen as the norm’ and ‘reigns 
supreme when it comes to the division of major assets’- Finch and Mason (n 49) 77. See also H Conway and 
Lisa Glennon, ‘To Give or Not To Give?’: The Transmission of Wealth On Death by Older Persons, Report for 
the Changing Ageing Partnership, Institute of Governance, Queen’s University Belfast (October 2010) 
(interviews carried out with focus groups confirmed that the majority of parents with more than one adult child 
intended to benefit them all equally). For a discussion of equivalent trends in the US, see Drake (n 4) 97 and TA 
Dunn and JW Phillips, Do Parents Divide Resources Equally Among Children? Evidence from the AHEAD 
Survey, Centre for Policy Research, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University 
(Aging Studies Programme (Paper No 5), 1997). However, studies have shown that unequal treatment is more 
common with lifetime gifts, with parents taking account of their children’s respective earning powers, financial 
needs and circumstances when giving them different levels of monetary support- see Dunn and Phillips (ibid), as 
well as M Lundholm and H Ohlsson, ‘Post Mortem Reputation, Compensatory Gifts and Equal Bequests’ 
(2000) 68 Economics Letters 165. 
79 See generally McMullen (n 38) 78-79 and JC Tate, ‘Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom’ 
(2008) 42 University of California Davis Law Review 129.  
80 Equal distribution could be perceived as unfair or unjust by the caregiving or financially needy child, 
precipitating family breakdown. 
 Making a will is a poignant act, which forces an individual to confront their own 
mortality, assess their life’s achievements and contemplate their post-mortem legacy.81 If 
contemplating an uneven estate distribution, McMullen argues that parents should think ‘long 
and hard about the bitterness and fighting’ that might result amongst their children, especially 
when the parent is not there to ‘explain or defend’ their actions, or to ‘soothe hurt feelings 
and feelings of rejection’.82 More importantly perhaps, parents should be mindful of the old 
adage that ‘honesty is the best policy’, and tell their children what they are contemplating 
well in advance83- instead of leaving their grieving off-spring to discover this for themselves 
when the contents of the will are revealed during what is already an emotionally fraught time 
(and when explanations written into the will itself might not be enough, no matter how clear 
or well-meaning).84 Adopting this approach would also give the children time to come to 
terms with the intended estate division, and to understand the parent’s motivations, instead of 
the disappointed sibling simply seeing this as a final statement that their parent loved them 
less and the same parent’s memory being tarnished by the contents of the will. Engaging in 
these conversations presents its own challenges, because of an ingrained reticence to discuss 
such a sensitive topic. As Isaacs explains: 
 
Discussion of death and aspects of death by children with their parents in our 
society is still a major taboo. Parents generally keep the provisions of their will 
secret, and those who stand to inherit generally do not inquire about the will or 
the specific provisions involved in it. This leaves the parents in a position to 
decide unilaterally on the division of their estate without the unpleasantness of 
having to explain to potential recipients why specific decisions were made.85  
 
                                                 
81 Sneddon (n 70) 359, describing this as ‘journey of self-discovery’.  
82 McMullen (n 38), p 87. 
83 ‘To avoid leaving a legacy of injured relationships, older parents do best to grapple realistically with the 
power they hold, rather than avoid facing this truth’- W Lustbader, ‘Conflict, Emotion and Power Surrounding 
Legacy’ (1996) Generations 54, 54. 
84 For example, Daisy Goodwin’s mother included a line in her will to the effect that: ‘I leave my daughter 
Daisy out of the estate, not because I love her any the less but because I think she has less need of it’ (n 76). In 
spite of this, Goodwin still feels that her mother did not love her as much Goodwin’s other siblings. 
85 Isaacs (n 4). Though this social-cultural reticence may reflect a particular generation; the baby boomers, who 
have been more open about money, religion and sex than previous generations, may be more willing to disclose 
the contents of their wills to their children. I am grateful to Professor Vines for drawing this to my attention.  
However, the last point highlights what can be a significant emotional barrier to open 
disclosure: parents may be reluctant to reveal a will’s contents, fearful that their children will 
be hurt, withdraw care and support, or pressurise the parent into changing their mind.86 
 
Of course, there is an uncomfortable reality that we may be reluctant to confront here: 
by favouring unequal division (and in some cases, disinheriting a child) parents are admitting 
a preference for a particular son or daughter. Society assumes that parents love all their 
children equally, and the ‘the norm of equal attachment’ is perhaps one of the greatest ‘social 
perceptions regulating parents’ relations with their children’.87 Parents, in turn, may feel 
constrained by societal constructs of fairness and equality- and how an unequal or seemingly 
inequitable estate distribution would be perceived, despite how they feel about each of their 
children. Take Faith, Goff and Tollinson’s analysis of sibling rivalry traits in competition for 
intergenerational wealth transfers, the authors drawing on earlier studies carried out by 
Berheim and Severinov: 
 
Berheim and Severinov...assume that children care about how much their parents 
love them relative to their siblings and use bequests as a signal of parental 
affection. They show that under certain conditions, altruistic parents, whether 
they in fact love their children equally or not, choose equal bequests so that their 
kids will not suffer from any perceived inequalities in parental affection. Thus 
equal division becomes the social norm.88  
   
However, not all parents are thus inclined when it comes to estate distributions, and what 
precedes them. Overt acts of parental favouritism are perhaps more common than we think: 
consider the biblical example of the favourite son Joseph in the Book of Genesis,89 and a 
recent anonymous English survey which suggested that parents (while not willing to admit it) 
do have a favourite child.90 In legal jurisdictions where there is no principle of compulsory 
                                                 
86 There is also the possibility that, raising the issue in the hope of preventing bitterness and fighting between 
one’s children at a later stage, simply runs the risk of bringing the dispute forward. 
87 J Aldous, E Klaus and DM Klein, ‘The Understanding Heart: Aging Parents and Their Favorite Children’ 
(1985) 56 Child Development 303, p 303.  
88 RL Faith, BL Goff and RD Tollinson, ‘Bequests, Sibling Rivalry and Rent Seeking’ (2008) 136 Public 
Choice 397, 398. Lundholm and Ohlsson (n 78) also suggest that parents are aware of the public nature of 
bequests under wills, and want to avoid the post-mortem reputational damage they would ‘suffer’ if they left 
their children uneven amounts. 
89 ‘Now Israel loved Joseph more than all his children, because he was the son of his old age: and he made him a 
coat of many colours’ (Genesis 37:3). 
90 One in 12 parents admitted to having a child they liked more than their other offspring, while eight per cent 
said they had a child who they treated differently because that child was their favourite- J Stevens, ‘One in 12 
Parents Admits to Having a Child They Love More Than the Rest’, Daily Mail (London, 21 February 2013) 
located at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2281781/1-12-parents-admits-having-child-love-rest.html> 
succession, parents can treat their children unequally when making an estate distribution- 
reflecting the fact that a particular child is ‘the favourite’, or that the parent does not, for 
example, have a close and loving relationship with one child or does not approve of that 
particular child’s lifestyle choices etc. An unequal estate distribution may feel like an obvious 
choice in these circumstances; the dead parent may also ‘lack inhibitions at death which 
tempered [their]…conduct during life’,91 and is ‘exempt from the consequences’92 of their 
actions. Disinheriting a child (or treating them less favourably than their siblings) is the 
ultimate parental sanction, a final and lasting signal of displeasure, disappointment and 
rejection.93  
 
Brody has suggested that discrepancies in a parent’s treatment of their children ‘create 
negativity in the sibling relationship by inducing feelings of rivalry and anger’.94 In the will-
making context, this suggests that parents play a significant role in what materialises between 
their children following a parent’s death. However, this is only part of the picture; it is 
ultimately the siblings themselves who are responsible for perpetuating old grievances and 
resentments which re-emerge here, particularly when they are adults. As Safer has remarked:  
 
Parents are responsible for converting sibling rivalry into sibling strife in the first 
place, but it is the siblings themselves who perpetuate it…Even when they are 
adults- even when their parents are dead- many siblings nurse memories of 
slights, recalling to their detriment who was preferred and who was 
overlooked…95 
 
An unequal inheritance simply provides another excuse for keeping sibling feuds alive, long 
after the parent is dead. 
 
 
VI. THE LAW’S RESPONSE TO CONTESTED WILLS 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(accessed January 2016). See also J Kluger, The Sibling Effect: What Bonds Among Brothers and Sisters Reveal 
About Us (Riverhead Books, 2013), the author citing a study by researchers from the University of California 
which followed 384 sibling pairs and their parents for three years; its findings suggested that 65 per cent of the 
mothers and 70 per cent of fathers exhibited a preference for one child.  
91 AJ Hirsch and WKS Lang, ‘A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand’ (1992) 68 Indiana Law Journal 1, 13. 
92 McMullen (n 38) 87.  
93 ‘To be disinherited by a parent is to be disowned- to become an orphan retroactive to birth. Even to receive 
less than other beneficiaries who are similarly situated is exquisitely painful’- Accettura (n 38) 35. See also 
Lustbader (n 83) 56: ‘Inflicting a hurt that can never be redressed, the most painful power a parent can wield is 
to punish from the grave’.  
94 Brody (n 26) 7. 
95 Safer (n 28) 58. 
When it comes to bequests from parents to children, equal treatment now tends to be viewed 
as the parental and social norm.96 This means that non-conformist estate distributions often 
attract judicial scrutiny, if challenged by a marginalised or excluded child.  
 
Although testamentary freedom is a foundational principle of common law legal 
systems, the idea is most firmly entrenched in American legal jurisprudence. Courts here 
cannot simply overturn an estate distribution, since they have no authority to vary the terms 
of an otherwise valid will. However, herein lies the problem: a judicial tendency to invalidate 
wills on slender evidence of non-compliance with the requisite formalities, where a testator 
has excluded their immediate family. Foster has noted that such wills raise ‘judicial red flags’ 
and are more susceptible to defeat on grounds of undue influence or lack of mental 
capacity,97 sentiments echoed more recently by Johnson: 
 
Numerous commentators have noticed that testamentary plans that conform to 
social norms, such as providing for members of the decedent’s family, are likely 
to be upheld; while wills that seek to dispose of a testator’s property in a less 
conventional manner are often defeated on various grounds…98   
 
What Leslie describes as ‘covert manipulation’99 of legal doctrine to invalidate non-
traditional wills can also be invoked where parents exclude children completely or favour one 
child at the expense of the other(s).100 The judicial tendency towards this produces an ironic 
result: people are encouraged to write wills where they ‘desire a non-standard [estate] 
distribution’,101 but the resultant legal scheme is vulnerable if it seems inconsistent with 
prevailing socio-cultural norms. The property owner’s ability to make free choices can be 
heavily circumscribed here, because of a judge’s socially-conditioned, subjective disapproval 
of what the will-maker has done.  
                                                 
96 ‘[A]t least in the normal situation of a parent liking all the children, ignoring the values of rewarding a child 
who has helped the parent more...or the child in greater need of the money’- Isaacs (n 4).  
97 F Foster, ‘The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law’ (2001) 80 North Carolina Law Review 199, 211. 
98 ID Johnson, ‘There’s a Will, But No Way: Whatever Happened to the Doctrine of Testamentary Freedom and 
What Can (Should) We Do to Restore It?’ (2011) 4 Estate Planning and Community Property Law Journal 105, 
106 and the sources listed in support. See also MB Leslie, ‘The Myth of Testamentary Freedom’ (1996) 38 
Arizona Law Review 235, 236 (‘Notwithstanding frequent declarations to the contrary, many courts are as 
committed to ensuring that testators devise their estates in accordance with prevailing normative views as they 
are to effectuating testamentary intent’) and R Madoff, ‘Unmasking Undue Influence’ (1997) 81 Minnesota Law 
Review 571, 576 (‘the undue influence doctrine denies freedom of testation for people who deviate from 
judicially imposed testamentary norms’). 
99 Leslie (n 98) 236. 
100 Though wills which favour one child may still be upheld where ‘disinheritance of the other children was 
apparently based on their unworthiness relative to the child who was the primary beneficiary’- see Johnson (n 
98) 116 and the various cases cited therein.   
101 Johnson (n 98) 110. 
 Similar trends can be seen on the other side of the Atlantic.102 However, English law 
offers a more direct route for challenging wills where a deceased parent exhibits a clear 
preference between their offspring, or excludes a particular child. The Inheritance (Provision 
for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 governs what is known as ‘family provision’ in this 
country, allowing specific individuals to challenge a valid will103 on the basis of relational or 
dependency ties to the deceased which transcend death.104 If successful, financial provision 
can be made for the applicant from the deceased’ estate, despite the fact that no such reward 
(or a substantially lower one) was contemplated under the deceased’s will.105 Adult children 
can apply,106 on the basis that a deceased parent failed to make ‘reasonable financial 
provision’ for them.107 Judges have consistently stressed that it is not their function to re-
write the deceased’s will or pass moral judgment on the deceased’s actions; in any 
application under the 1975 Act, courts cannot simply overturn what seem like blatant 
injustices or provide for someone who feels hard done by.108 Yet, context is everything, and 
as Arden LJ pointed out in the first Court of Appeal judgment in Ilot v Mitson,109 what 
                                                 
102 For example, in Sharp v Adam [2005] EWHC 1806 (Ch) (upheld on appeal at [2006] EWCA 449) the 
testator was suffering from secondary progressive multiple sclerosis, and was paralysed and unable to speak 
when he made his final will. He left the bulk of his estate to two employees, along with a legacy for a carer, but 
excluded his two adult daughters who had previously been the primary beneficiaries. The judge held that the 
deceased lacked testamentary capacity, most likely because of a ‘temporary poisoning of his natural affection 
for his daughters, or a perversion of his sense of right, which nobody could satisfactorily explain’ ([2005] 
EWHC 1806 (Ch), [254]). The fact that the estate distribution favoured non-family members was undoubtedly 
the key factor here- for an overview of this and other similar cases, see J Aspen, ‘Where Now for Testamentary 
Freedom?’, The Barrister Magazine (2010).  
103 Or intestacy distribution- though the emphasis here is on testate deaths. 
104 For an overview, see G Douglas, ‘Family Provision and Family Practices-The Discretionary Regime of the 
Inheritance Act of England and Wales’ (2014) 4 Oñati Socio-Legal Series. 
105 New Zealand was the first country to limit freedom of testation in this manner, under the Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act 1900. Similar statutory schemes were subsequently adopted by other common law 
jurisdictions- see L Englefeld, Australian Family Provision Law (Australia, Lawbook Company, 2011) and C 
Harvey and L Vincent, The Law of Dependants’ Relief in Canada (Toronto, Carswell, 2nd edn, 2006). However, 
the United States remains a notable exception.  
106 Section 1(1) of the 1975 Act lists the eligible categories of claimant, and includes ‘a child of the deceased’ (s 
1(1)(c)). There is no age restriction.  
107 1975 Act, s 1(2). Failure to make reasonable financial provision underpins the legislation. However, with the 
exception of a surviving spouse or civil partner of the deceased, all other claims under the 1975 Act are 
restricted by a ‘maintenance’ threshold under s 1(2)(b)- in other words, reasonable financial provision is defined 
by what it would be reasonable for the applicant to receive for his/her maintenance. The concept of 
‘maintenance’ is not defined in the statute, although the following dictum of Goff LJ in Re Coventry [1980] Ch 
461, 485 is still regarded as authoritative: ‘What is proper maintenance must...depend on all the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case... [I]t is not just enough to enable a person to get by, [but] on the other hand, 
it does not mean anything which may be regarded as reasonably desirable for [an applicant’s] general benefit or 
welfare’. 
108 See for example, the comments of Oliver J at first instance in Re Coventry [1980] Ch 461, 475. 
109 [2011] EWCA Civ 346. 
constitutes reasonable financial provision must take account of ‘current social conditions and 
values’.110 More importantly, when deciding family provision claims, judges must:   
 
…decide questions involving value judgments within four corners of the statutory 
framework and with the benefit of their own awareness and experience of society 
and social issues, and their own considered view of how such matters ought fairly 
to be decided in the society in which we live.111 
 
The mere fact that an individual is a child of the deceased does not generate any 
automatic entitlement to an (increased) inheritance; the system is a discretionary one, with 
clear statutory parameters.112 However, judicial decision-making appears, on occasion, to be 
influenced by prevailing socio-cultural norms around how parents should treat their children 
when passing on wealth.113 In some instances, courts have not been inclined to rule in favour 
of an adult child who has been left nothing (or little) under a parent’s will, deciding that 
financial need was not enough in itself and that a long-term rift between parent and child 
‘justifies’ no inheritance provision.114 In others, claims have been allowed based on 
inequalities in the respective life positions of siblings,115 or a particular son or daughter’s lack 
of earning capacity.116 The long-running litigation in Ilot v Mitson,117 where a mother 
excluded her only child from an estate worth close to £500,000, may also signal a more 
expansive approach. In July 2015, the Court of Appeal awarded the daughter £163,000, 
despite the fact that mother and child had been estranged for almost 40 years and the mother 
was clear in her intent to exclude the daughter from the will and had communicated this to 
                                                 
110 Ibid, [67].  
111 Ibid, [68]. 
112 Courts are instructed to take account of specific factors- for example, the financial resources and future needs 
of the applicant, those of the other estate beneficiaries, the size of the estate, and any mental or physical 
disability of the applicant to name but a few (1975 Act, s 3(1)). For applications by children, the court must also 
specifically look at the ‘manner in which the applicant was being, or...might expect to be, educated or trained’ (s 
3(3)).  
113 Though it is difficult to tease a clear jurisprudential thread from a highly fact-specific array of cases- see H 
Conway, ‘Do Parents Always Know Best? Posthumous Provision and Adult Children’ in W Barr (ed), Modern 
Studies in Property Law: Volume 8 (Oxford, Hart, 2015) ch 7. 
114 See for example, Re Garland [2007] EWHC 2 (Ch). 
115 Re Creeney [1984] NI 397 (bulk of father’s estate left to his financially secure daughter; deceased’s son was 
not financially well-off). Although this is a Northern Ireland case, the exact same statutory framework applies 
under the Inheritance (Provisions for Family and Dependants) (NI) Order 1979. 
116 Re Hancock [1998] 2 FLR 346 and McKernan v McKernan [2007] NICh 6. In the latter case, the daughter’s 
claim succeeded, despite the court accepting that the deceased was ‘quite clear in her mind that she did not want 
to leave a legacy to her only daughter’ (ibid, [27]) and that she viewed her daughter as ‘lazy’ (ibid, [36]), as well 
as the court acknowledging that the mother ‘was entitled to exercise a preference amongst her children’ (ibid, 
[38]).    
117 [2009] EWHC 3114 (Fam); [2011] EWCA Civ; [2014] EWHC 542 (Fam); and [2015] EWCA Civ 797. 
her several years earlier.118 Mitson not only re-opens the issue of allowing courts to interfere 
with testamentary freedom, and a will-maker’s ‘right to spite’; it will encourage more 
independent adult children119 to claim under the 1975 Act, regardless of the deceased’s 
express wishes.120   
 
Estate contests involving adult children require judges to resolve what are effectively 
emotional issues after a parent’s death- dealing with overtly negative sentiments, complicated 
family histories and enduring estrangements which the parties themselves could not resolve 
while the parent was still alive, and which may have been perpetuated for decades. Resorting 
to concepts such as non-compliance with formalities, duress or undue influence (the 
dominant models for invalidating wills in the US) or legislative constructs of ‘reasonable 
financial provision’ (under the English family provision system) allows judges to seek solace 
in established legal precepts and to place a veneer of objectivity on their decisions. There 
may also be therapeutic benefits for those involved in the dispute, as framing the outcome in 
this way reduces the amount of (additional) damage being inflicted on an emotionally 
vulnerable yet volatile family ‘unit’ which has already been pushed to breaking point. Yet, 
judges are seldom dispassionate and neutral observers,121 and estate contests between adult 
siblings are no exception. The conclusions reached in some of these cases suggest that judges 
are, in many ways, ‘passing judgment’ on whether children should be treated equally; who 
was a good and dutiful child; who showed the dead parent proper love, respect and attention; 
                                                 
118 The facts merit closer attention. In 1978, the 17-year-old daughter left home to live with a man of whom her 
mother disapproved; mother and daughter were not reconciled before the mother’s death in July 2004. After 
executing her final will in April 2002, the mother informed her daughter in a letter that she would be excluded 
due to the pain which the daughter had inflicted on the mother. The daughter responded in another letter, 
indicating that she understood that she would receive nothing. When the mother died, her only child was aged 
44 and had five children of her own, had not worked since the birth of her first child (the husband worked part-
time) and was living in a 3 bedroomed house rented from a Housing Association; the mother’s entire estate went 
to various animal welfare charities. The daughter argued under the 1975 Act that her mother had failed to make 
reasonable financial provision for her, and the district judge awarded her £50,000 from the estate. However, the 
daughter appealed on the basis that this amount was insufficient. Eleanor King J reversed the earlier decision- 
under the legislation, it was not a question of whether the mother had acted unreasonably; the parties’ 
estrangement was ‘profound and enduring’  and while the daughter was in financial need this was the result of 
her own ‘lifestyle choices’- [2009] EWHC 3114 (Fam), [61]. However, this decision was overturned by Court of 
Appeal- [2011] EWCA Civ 346. The daughter’s outstanding appeal was then remitted to the High Court which 
upheld the original award of £50,000 (despite the daughter seeking half the value of the estate)- [2014] EWHC 
542 (Fam). Following a further appeal by the daughter, the Court of Appeal raised this amount to £163,000- 
[2015] EWCA Civ 797. At the time of writing, the charities had been given leave to appeal the decision on 
quantum to the Supreme Court.  
119 In other words, those who are economically self-sufficient (or, at least, capable of earning their own living), 
and who were not financially dependent on a deceased parent before death (even if in financial need). 
120 J Holland, ‘Ilot v Mitson: A Lesson For Practitioners?’ (2012) 2 Elder Law Journal 59.  
121 TA Maroney, ‘The Persistent Script of Judicial Dispassion’ (2011) 99 California Law Review 629. See also 
the same author’s chapter in the current collection- Maroney, Ch 12. 
and whether the deceased was ‘justified’ in treating his/her children differently or was simply 
being spiteful. These are all extremely difficult (and highly subjective) value-judgments for 
courts to make.  
 
Of course, judges have their own intuitive sense of what is morally and emotionally 
acceptable, and not just because of the family scenario that unfolds before them as both sides 
present their evidence. Perhaps we should not be too surprised if judges (who bring their own 
emotional instincts and cultural ‘baggage’ to the cases which come before them) may be 
tempted to correct parental disinheritance or unequal distribution between children in some 
way.122 In many ways, the ‘normative expectation that parents will leave their estate to their 
children create[s] a corresponding right of the children to receive’123 and judges are using 
whatever legal tools they have at their disposal to achieve this. This creates its own problems; 
as Drake has pointed out, ‘[i]t is precisely the discretionary quality of inheritance giving that 
renders it powerfully symbolic of parental responsibility and affection’.124  
 
 
VII. LIMITING THE EMOTIONAL FALL-OUT 
 
Most sibling inheritance disputes have their genesis in issues which are not solely related to 
the distribution of the dead parent’s estate. Old family grievances masquerade as a quarrel 
over money, property and material possessions, with the parties hiding behind the 
institutional façade of the law to revisit past wrongs. As Folberg has pointed out:  
 
[F]amily property and financial disputes…are matters of the heart and the law. 
They present challenges for how emotions and family dynamics are to be 
weighed against and balanced with legal rights and obligations.125 
 
The question here is not whether emotions should be recognised in the law’s response to 
sibling inheritance disputes; they are intrinsic and integral components of the legal matrix 
because these disputes are driven by and create emotion. And while lawyers and other legal 
                                                 
122 Though it is worth noting that, in family provision claims, courts have not substituted an equal division just 
because an adult child has been treated less favourably than their siblings- see for example, Re Hancock [1998] 
2 FLR 346 and Re Creeny [1984] NI 397. In contrast, if a will is declared invalid in the US on any of the 
grounds mentioned (eg. non-compliance with formalities, duress), the estate would usually lapse into intestacy 
and the deceased’s children would automatically inherit in equal shares.   
123 Drake (n 4) 96. 
124 Drake (n 4) 96. 
125 Folberg (n 37) 12.  
actors already recognise this, more could be done to lessen the emotional fallout from an 
uneven estate distribution between children. 
 
The role of the lawyer is an important one when the parent is making will. It goes 
without saying that lawyers are obliged to reflect their client’s wishes, and to ensure a legally 
binding document. However, the preoccupation with legalise and property arrangements 
often detracts from advising clients on the emotional legacy which the document will also 
generate. Noting that the estate planning process provides a unique opportunity for exploring 
someone’s personal legacy, Sneddon argues that an ‘attorney draftsperson....must be more 
than a mere transcribing device’.126 Encouraging will-makers to appreciate the emotional 
ramifications of their choices if contemplating uneven bequests, and to discuss this 
sensitively with their children in advance, are important tools. Legal drafting can take 
account of emotions as well. Varying the language used in the will, to generate a more 
personal narrative and explain the parent’s reasons for specific bequests, might also ensure 
that lawyers are the first stage in preventing family conflict.127 
 
When sibling inheritance disputes end up in the legal arena, judges need to be 
cognisant both of the intense emotions at play but also of their limited ability to address these 
emotions in a judicial setting. By producing a certain result, judges can mitigate some of the 
hurt (both financial and emotional) inflicted by the dead parent. Invalidating a will on what 
might be minimal evidence of non-compliance with formalities is a classic example, as is the 
strategy of appeasement facilitated by the family provision system whereby judges can give 
the disadvantaged sibling something out of the estate. The big difficulty is that the doctrine of 
testamentary freedom is supposed to have some force, and overthrowing or changing the will 
undermines that. And while we might argue that judges should spend more time trying to 
discover a testator’s underlying intent without judging his/her motives, Baron makes the 
point that ‘empathy carries risks’ because the ‘finder of fact may be unable to cast aside his 
or her own beliefs in the attempt to grasp another’s’.128   
  
Another option would be to move away from a court-centric decision making process, 
towards alternative dispute resolution. Of course, under the current regime, the actual 
                                                 
126 Sneddon (n 70) 375-376.  
127 O’Sullivan (n 75) 25. 
128 JE Baron, ‘Empathy, Subjectivity and Testamentary Capacity’ (1987) 24 San Diego Law Review 1043, 1044. 
litigation can be seen as a form of emotional catharsis; a sibling who feels excluded or 
marginalised by a parent’s will is able to raise issues which have been festering for years, and 
to finally vent his/her feelings in public. However, the emotionally charged litigation route 
has obvious drawbacks. Sibling inheritance disputes (like any family dispute) involve 
ongoing relationships, yet an adversarial system ‘affirms for the parties that the contest is 
about winning and losing’129- tapping into the same feelings which plagued the 
disenfranchised sibling throughout their childhood (though one could argue that everyone 
involved in these cases invariably feels hurt or angry). Court proceedings also dissipate the 
estate, and create further animosity between the siblings who, having just lost their sole, 
surviving parent, are now ‘on the way to irrevocably losing each other’.130 In exploring other 
options, legally mandated mediation could offer a better alternative, and not just because it 
should be cheaper and more efficient; everyone involved could address the underlying 
emotional issues, develop a uniquely responsive solution within a private setting (since the 
dispute is not played out in a public form) and perhaps restore some measure of family 
harmony.131 As with any solution, there are drawbacks. Mediation is not always effective, 
and research carried out in Australia suggests that it is more likely to fail in family provision 
disputes between siblings than in other categories of litigant:  
 
[A]necdotal comments from lawyers and mediators [suggest] that cases between 
siblings are the most bitterly fought of all. All other relationships seem more 
amenable to resolution through mediation. This is probably simply an expression 
of the fact that sibling rivalry is a lifelong psychological construct which is hardly 
likely to melt away with ease.132 
 
Because siblings have already had longer (in reality, most of their lives) to get into their 
positions, there is no guarantee that mediation will succeed; and even if a solution can be 
reached, the resultant damage may be beyond repair so that siblings will be estranged from, 
or actively hostile towards, each other for years to come. Despite this, mediation should be 
encouraged, and given every chance to work. Resolving disputes without going to court not 
                                                 
129 Weinstein and Weinstein (n 45) 375. 
130 LP Love, ‘Mediation of Probate Matters: Leaving a Valuable Legacy’ (2001) 1 Pepperdine Dispute 
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132 P Vines, Bleak House Revisited: Disproportionality in Family Provision Estate Litigation in New South 
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the most disproportionate level of costs in family provision cases were in sibling disputes, well ahead of 
disputes between first families and later spouses- ibid, 14. 
only allows everyone involved to retain some measure of control over the process. It also 
enables complex emotions to be expressed, acknowledged and recognised,133 with a view to 
lessening the overall emotional harm and (ideally) paving the way for reparation- or, at the 





Inheritance disputes are not so much about money. People fight over the love they 
feel they did not receive.134  
 
Estate contests are not just about property and financial issues; they involve relational issues 
as well. The result is an inherently complex emotional dimension, something which is 
especially true in disputes between adult siblings over the distribution of parental wealth. 
Most of these disputes are not simply driven by money (though that may be a factor as well); 
they are emotionally driven, because specific bequests are viewed as posthumous 
representations of ‘love, validation, and importance’135 between parent and child. 
Underpinning this are deep-seated feelings of sibling rivalry with all its negative traits, mixed 
with an equally toxic cocktail of grief emotions at a time of intense personal (and familial) 
upheaval.  
 
Many people engage in destructive litigation; but sibling inheritance disputes take this 
to another level because of ongoing family relationships and the emotional backdrop to the 
litigation. These disputes become all-consuming. Each side ‘demonises the other’136 in what 
will usually be very public litigation over a very private issue (something of a paradox in 
itself). The impact of the dispute reverberates through the entire family, resulting in 
emotional wounds which, in more extreme scenarios, ‘may be fatal or take generations to 
heal’.137 In light of all this, there is much to be said for encouraging parents to be aware of 
the consequences of their actions from the outset, and for lawyers to be mindful of the role 
that they play in anticipating sibling disputes over parental wealth. By the time a dispute ends 
up in court, much of the emotional damage has already been done, and judges can only hope 
that their handling and resolution of the issues will not aggravate or perpetuate existing 
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family tensions. Mediation is not a panacea, but offers one way of keeping these conflicts 
away from adversarial court proceedings in the interests of all concerned. 
  
 
  
 
